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I
INTRODUCTION
In an amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court in the companion
assisted suicide cases of Washington v. Glucksberg1 and Vacco v. Quill,2 Ronald
Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and
Judith Jarvis Thomson describe themselves as “six moral and political philoso-
phers who differ on many issues of public morality and policy.”3  Perhaps a dis-
tinction exists between Rawls’s veil of ignorance and Nagel’s higher order im-
partiality, but it is hard to imagine what the word “differ” might mean for these
philosophers who are all engaged in the same liberal political discourse re-
garding contractarian democracy and all teach at elite American universities.
Include a communitarian such as Michael Sandel, a Catholic like Alasdair Mac-
Intyre, an evangelical Christian such as David Smolin, or a pragmatist like
Richard Rorty and then one could arguably have a group that “differ[s] on
many issues of public morality and policy” because such a group would differ
on the very paradigm from which its members approached “public morality and
policy.”
Since its first medical symposium in 1939, Law and Contemporary Problems
has sustained an analysis of questions pressing on the intersection of law and
medicine.  At other times, Law and Contemporary Problems has addressed the
challenges of religion in public life and the legal questions raised by old age.
                                                          
Copyright © 1998 by Law and Contemporary Problems
This note is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/61LCPChurch.
* J.D., and M.A. in Religion, Duke University, May 1998.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (rejecting a due process right to assisted suicide).
2. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (rejecting an equal protection claim to assisted suicide).
3. Brief for Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and
Judith Jarvis Thomson as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) and Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) [hereinafter
Philosophers’ Brief].
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The current debates over euthanasia, one moment of which is represented in
the philosophers’ brief, bring to a convergence these various topics.  This note
argues that the philosophers’ charge—that prohibiting physician-assisted sui-
cide can only be based on impermissible sectarian religious or ethical prem-
ises—is one that can be raised against the philosophers’ supposedly “neutral”
liberal argument itself.  The philosophers’ position—advocating a right to as-
sisted suicide—is based on a liberal conception of the good that values individ-
ual autonomy, abstract rationality, equality, and tolerance; this conception of
the good is no more neutral than other religious or ethical positions.  Thus, the
philosophers also seek to impose a contentious religious or ethical position on
American society.  The philosophers’ arguments, uncloaked from the liberal
rhetoric of neutrality, expose them as just other political participants engaged
in promoting a particular ethical position that is neither universally evident nor
accepted.  This criticism of the philosophers’ position is not fatal.  Indeed, all
positions must represent some such sectarian perspective.  However, it makes
the thrust of their attack against positions prohibiting assisted suicide—that is,
that such positions are impermissible embodiments of sectarian conceptions of
the good—ironic and rhetorically less significant.
Relying on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Fish, Part II of this
note exposes liberalism as just another substantive conception of the good that
includes and precludes other positions by referring back to its own substantive
conception of the good.  Part III then analyzes the arguments in the philoso-
phers’ brief to highlight the liberal rhetorical structure used to get and keep
their argument going while at the same time masking the controverted liberal
premises which undergird that argument.  This analysis also considers former
Solicitor General Walter Dellinger’s brief in the cases because the philosophers
use it as a straw-man to attack positions prohibiting assisted suicide.  The cen-
tral argument of this note is that the position put forward by the philosophers is
not neutral at all, but the embodiment of a particular substantive tradition
which is just as intolerant of other approaches to seeking the good life as any
other religious or philosophical tradition.  This argument does not defeat the
liberal position, but nonetheless, it makes the philosophers’ call for the exclu-
sion of arguments that are based in substantive traditions self-contradictory and
therefore vacuous.
II
LIBERALISM AS A SUBSTANTIVE TRADITION
The “neutral” language of rights and autonomy that cloaks liberal argu-
ments is actually a substantive moral position.  Liberals’ historic claim to neu-
trality is based on the claim that liberalism allows individuals to pursue what-
ever conception of the good they wish.  Immanuel Kant argues, “[n]o-one can
compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of oth-
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ers, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit.”4  Similarly,
John Locke suggests that “[t]he commonwealth seems to me to be a society of
men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own
civil interests.”5  Likewise, in a more recent formulation of liberalism, Will
Kymlicka claims that liberalism “allows people to choose a conception of the
good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new
and hopefully better plan of life.”6
Despite these claims, the liberal tradition does promote particular substan-
tive values: abstract rationality, equality, individual autonomy, and tolerance in
particular.  Regarding rationality, Kant argues,
Friends of the human race and of all that it holds most sacred!  Accept whatever
seems most credible to you after careful and honest examination, whether it is a mat-
ter of facts or of rational arguments; but do not deny reason that prerogative which
makes it the greatest good on earth, namely its right to be the ultimate touchstone of
truth.7
Regarding equality, Kant argues for a radical equality despite differences for
which we are or are not responsible:
This uniform equality of human beings as subjects of a state is, however, perfectly
consistent with the utmost inequality of the mass in the degree of its possessions,
whether these take the form of physical or mental superiority over others, or of fortui-
tous external property and of particular rights (of which there may be many) with re-
spect to others.8
The move to rationality and equality for Kant facilitated a morality based on a
common rationality which, by equalizing all citizens, could make all subject to
and protected by the categorical imperative’s demand to treat others as ends
not means.9
Liberalism’s focus on individual autonomy and tolerance is demonstrated in
the writings of John Stuart Mill:  “[I]ndividuality is the same thing with devel-
opment, and . . . it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can
produce, well-developed human beings.”10  Mill’s argument for tolerance is
grounded in epistemological fallibilism—that is, universal uncertainty which
thereby mandates tolerance of other possibly correct opinions.
[T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. . . .
To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume
                                                          
4. Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: “This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply
in Practice”, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 61, 74 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge
1970) (1793).
5. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 17 (William Popple trans., Patrick Ro-
manell ed., Liberal Arts Press 1950) (1689).
6. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 80 (1995).
7. Immanuel Kant, What Is Orientation in Thinking?, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra
note 4, at 237, 249 (1786).
8. Kant, supra note 4, at 75.
9. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS AND WHAT IS
ENLIGHTENMENT? 28 (Lewis Beck trans., Prentice Hall 1995) (1785).
10. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 60 (David Spitz ed., Norton 1975) (1859).
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that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty.  All silencing of discussion
is an assumption of infallibility.11
Again, a modern reformulation of the liberal position is presented by Kym-
licka, who argues that liberalism is neutral to conceptions of the good life, but
merely mandates “two preconditions for leading a good life.  The first is that we
lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives
value to life. . . .  The second precondition is that we be free to question those
beliefs.”12
Thus, liberals do assert a substantive position on the good life for both indi-
viduals and communities.  Further, liberals must assert this substantive position
in their supposedly “neutral” theory for two reasons.  First, their notion of
autonomy must necessarily exclude communitarian conceptions of the good
that would demand public implementation.  Second, their position must de-
mand acceptance of abstract rationality as the exclusive means for seeking
knowledge of the world.  Not surprisingly, these rhetorical moves also drive the
philosophers’ brief.
When liberals confront nonliberal conceptions of the good, their commit-
ment to individualism must come to the forefront.  Kant argues that “[i]f a cer-
tain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws
(that is, unjust), then the use of coercion to counteract it, inasmuch as it is the
prevention of a hindrance to freedom, is consistent with freedom according to
universal laws.”13  But this requirement that only liberal voices be admitted to
the public sphere makes clear the sectarian position liberals are advancing.  As
Alasdair MacIntyre argues:
Every individual is to be equally free to propose and to live by whatever conception
of the good he or she pleases, derived from whatever theory or tradition he or she
may adhere to, unless that conception of the good involves reshaping the life of the
rest of the community in accordance with it. . . .  And this qualification of course en-
tails not only that liberal individualism does indeed have its own broad conception of
the good, which it is engaged in imposing politically, legally, socially, and culturally
wherever it has the power to do so, but also that in so doing its toleration of rival con-
ceptions of the good in the public arena is severally limited.14
Thus, liberal neutrality breaks down exactly when liberals face a substantive
conception of the good contrary to their own.  Similarly, Stanley Fish has ar-
gued that liberalism
does not have at its center an adjudicative mechanism that stands apart from any par-
ticular moral and political agenda.  Rather, it is a very particular moral agenda
(privileging the individual over the community, the cognitive over the affective, the
abstract over the particular) that has managed, by the very partisan means it claims to
transcend, to grab the moral high ground, and to grab it from a discourse—the dis-
                                                          
11. Id. at 18.
12. KYMLICKA, supra note 6, at 81.
13. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN 231 (Meiner 1966) (1797), quoted in KENNETH
BAYNES, THE NORMATIVE GROUNDS OF SOCIAL CRITICISM: KANT, RAWLS, AND HABERMAS 20
(1992).
14. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 336 (1988).
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course of religion—that had held it for centuries.15
It will be instructive to remember this argument because an attack on re-
ligious conceptions of the good drives the philosophers’ argument that the Con-
stitution requires neutrality toward controversial religious and philosophical
conceptions of the good.  But, as David Smolin has complained, neutrality to
religious conceptions of the good is a substantive position in itself.  “A concep-
tion of religion that seeks to ‘privatize’ it is in itself a non-neutral conception of
religion at variance with historic forms of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.”16
Liberalism is also a demonstrably particular substantive conception of the
good in its exclusion of “nonrational”—meaning nonabstract deductive ra-
tional—voices.  Fish argues that
liberalism is informed by a faith . . . in reason as a faculty that operates independently
of any particular world view.  It is therefore committed at once to allowing competing
world views equal access to its deliberative arena, and to disallowing the claims of any
one of them to be supreme, unless of course it is demonstrated to be at all points
compatible with the principles of reason. . . .  The one thing liberalism cannot do is
put reason inside the battle where it would have to contend with other adjudicative
principles and where it could not succeed merely by invoking itself because its own
status would be what was at issue.17
Thus, liberals claim that only individuals willing to engage in rational discourse
are to be admitted into the public discourse.
Liberals justify this exclusion of nonrational voices by suggesting that ra-
tionality must be our common ground because it is the only universal, nonpar-
ticular feature to which all humans have equal access.  As Kant argues:
Furthermore, it is evident that it is not only of the greatest necessity from a theoretical
point of view . . . but also of the utmost practical importance to derive the concepts
and laws of morals from pure reason . . . without making the principles depend upon
the particular nature of human reason. . . .  But since moral laws should hold for every
rational being as such, the principles must be derived from the universal concept of a
rational being in general.  In this manner all morals, which need anthropology for
their application to men, must be completely developed first as pure philosophy (i.e.
metaphysics), independently of anthropology.18
However, as Fish alluded to in the preceding passage, rationality does not exist
in the abstract, but is dependent on the community and tradition of discourse
within which it is located.  “In short, what is and is not a reason will always be a
matter of faith, that is, of the assumptions that are bedrock within a discursive
system which because it rests upon them cannot (without self-destructing) call
them into question.”19
Again, Fish and MacIntyre agree on this point.  MacIntyre argues, “[w]hat
the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to and what we now need to
                                                          
15. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH . . . AND IT’S A GOOD THING TOO
137-38 (1994).
16. David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Re-
sponse to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1091 (1991) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE
AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)).
17. FISH, supra note 15, at 134-35.
18. KANT, supra note 9, at 28.
19. FISH, supra note 15, at 136.
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recover is . . . a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition.”20
Furthermore, MacIntyre finds the inability of liberals themselves to articulate
these “neutral” principles of our common rationality to be the strongest argu-
ment that no such common principles exist.
That liberalism fails in this respect, therefore, provides the strongest reason that we
can actually have for asserting that there is no such neutral ground, that there is no
place for appeals to a practical-rationality-as-such . . . to which all rational persons
would by their very rationality be compelled to give their allegiance.  There is instead
only the practical-rationality-of-this-or-that tradition. . . .21
This leads MacIntyre to the conclusion that liberalism, despite its claim of neu-
trality, is just another sectarian tradition.
In their brief, the philosophers also defer to the role of rationality in adjudi-
cating the assisted suicide cases as if it were a free-floating concept for any in-
dividual to appropriate and use without definition or articulation.  The philoso-
phers then counterpose this position to supposedly nonrational authoritarian
religious conceptions of the good.  But, again, this distinction is untenable and
only makes evident that the philosophers are arguing for a specific liberal con-
ception of the good.  As Fish notes,
[i]n this [tolerance of only rational enquiry] liberalism does not differ from fundamen-
talism or from any other system of thought; for any ideology . . . must be founded on
some basic conception of what the world is like . . . and while the conception may ad-
mit of differences within its boundaries (and thus be, relatively, tolerant) it cannot le-
gitimize differences that would blur its boundaries, for that would be to delegitimize
itself.  A liberalism that did not “insist on reason as the only legitimate path to knowl-
edge about the world” would not be liberalism; the principle of a rationality that is
above the partisan fray . . . is not incidental to liberal thought; it is liberal
thought. . . .22
It is worth addressing several responses liberals might make to the criti-
cisms articulated generally in this section and applied particularly to the phi-
losophers’ brief in the next section.  The first response would claim that liber-
alism as enacted may be intolerant of nonrational public conceptions of the
good, but theoretically it need not be that way.  But, as Fish’s argument above
makes clear, liberalism’s survival necessitates that it preclude conceptions of
the good that would undercut its substantive position.  It cannot fail to argue
for intolerance of nonrational public conceptions of the good exactly because
liberals’ defense of neutrality, autonomy, and reason, despite liberals’ univer-
salistic claims, are particular claims and therefore must be defended.
A second response liberals might present is to acknowledge the above cri-
tique—that liberalism is internally inconsistent as a theory in claiming neutral-
ity as a value while espousing a substantive position—but nonetheless argue
that the substantive liberal position of neutrality toward positions is embodied
in the Constitution and, therefore, is appropriate for the Supreme Court to use
in adjudicating cases.  Without making a full-fledged historical survey of the
                                                          
20. MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 7.
21. Id. at 346.
22. FISH, supra note 15, at 137 (footnote omitted).
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Framer’s intentions, one argument in response, which parallels MacIntyre’s ar-
gument regarding moral discourse more broadly,23 runs as follows.  The Fram-
ers of the Constitution focused on individual rights in light of the particular his-
toric moment in which they found themselves, but they saw their work fitting
within a broader common law history that they did not wish to abandon com-
pletely.  Michael Sandel has suggested that for the colonists to find a rhetorical
position from which to attack the existing English law, they had to move their
dialogue to the abstract to create an argumentative space for their dissenting
position.  “In order to articulate their protest, the colonists were compelled to
abstract the fundamental principles of justice and right from the institutions
and traditions in which they were embodied, and to give these principles prior-
ity.”24  Thus, one may contend that this abstraction was not an attempt to do
away with substantive conceptions of the good, but was merely necessary to at-
tack the substantive English conception of justice from which the colonists
wanted to dissent.
However, as MacIntyre has argued that Kant’s categorical imperative pre-
supposed a community of discourse that could give substantive content to his
abstract statement of ethical duties, so also the Framers presupposed such a
historical common law context within which their abstract defense of rights
would be understood.  Unfortunately, both Kant’s and the Framer’s projects
were destructive of the very traditions upon which they relied.  Thus, as ethics
and constitutional adjudication have moved away from and destroyed that his-
torical context, both Kant’s works and constitutional discourse are now left
with only theoretical abstractions that cannot ground coherent substantive ethi-
cal and constitutional meanings.25
Evidence also exists within the constitutional tradition that communitarian
thought and substantive moral positions have both played important roles in
our country’s political discourse.  As the United States Catholic Conference ar-
gued in its motion for leave to file an amicus brief, “[t]he law has always acted
to restrain personal choices that harm persons or the common good.”26  As ex-
                                                          
23. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 54-56 (2d ed.
1984).
24. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 29 (1996).
25. MacIntyre argues that Kant’s ethical project had to fail because Kant abandoned the telos of
humanity (humans as they could be) as the goal of morality and, in its place, substituted abstract ra-
tionality.  Therefore, Kant was left with only two dissonant pieces of the moral puzzle: humans as they
are and their historic moral injunctions.  Separated from human’s telos, it was impossible to give ra-
tional arguments in defense of the moral injunctions that were in contradiction to humans’ basic nature
(humans as they are).  See MACINTYRE, supra note 23, at 54-55.  Furthermore, MacIntyre suggests
that Kant and other enlightenment thinkers nonetheless still “presuppose[d] something very like the
teleological scheme of God, freedom and happiness as the final crown of virtue. . . .  [But] detach mo-
rality from that framework and you will no longer have morality; or, at the very least, you will have
radically transformed its character.”  Id. at 56.  Thus, Kant’s moral theory relied on Christianity for its
moral teleology at the same time it undermined Christianity.  Practically then, what Kant left after the
destruction of teleological moral systems was only the “radically transformed character” of pure ra-
tional morality.
26. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of the United States
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amples, the Catholic Conference cited constitutionally permissible prohibitions
on unlimited abortions and the requirements that people agree to be vaccinated
against contagious diseases, as well as the many unchallenged statutes regulat-
ing “prostitution, suicide, voluntary self-mutilation, brutalizing ‘bare fist’ prize
fights, and duels,” and limitations on marriage “based on affinity, consanguin-
ity, and gender.”27
Furthermore, Sandel has responded to Rawls’s political liberalism by noting
Abraham Lincoln’s defense of substantive constitutional discourse.  In the Lin-
coln-Douglas debates, Stephen Douglas suggested bracketing contentious re-
ligious or ethical positions regarding slavery, just as the philosophers’ brief sug-
gests bracketing such positions regarding assisted suicide.  Lincoln challenged
such a vacuous, nonsubstantive view of political discourse by arguing that
[i]s it not a false statesmanship that undertakes to build up a system of policy upon
the basis of caring nothing about the very thing that every body does care the most
about? . . .
. . . .
He may say he don’t care whether an indifferent thing is voted up or down, but he
must logically have a choice between a right thing and a wrong thing.  He contends
that whatever community wants slaves has a right to have them.  So they have if it is
not a wrong.  But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right to do wrong.28
The Catholic Conference motion challenged the Court to consider essentially
the same question.  “At bottom, this case asks whether the kind of society we
are to become will reflect our deepest values or none at all.”29
Turning to the philosophers’ brief, the task of this note is to expose how the
substantive liberal conception of the good highlighted in this section is im-
ported into the philosophers’ arguments.  Again, this does not defeat the phi-
losophers’ position, but it does remove the rhetorical sting from their attack on
opponents of assisted suicide.
III
THE PHILOSOPHERS’ BRIEF
Much of the basic structure of the philosophers’ position is set out in the
first few sentences of their brief:
These cases do not invite or require the Court to make moral, ethical or religious
judgments about how people should approach or confront their death or about when
it is ethically appropriate to hasten one’s own death or to ask others for help in doing
so.  On the contrary, they ask the Court to recognize that individuals have a constitu-
                                                          
Catholic Conference et al. at 13, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) [hereinafter
Catholic Motion] (available on microfiche and on Lexis, 1995 US Briefs 1858).  The Court granted the
motion, which included a draft of the brief, on October 1, 1996; the final, amended amici brief was sub-
sequently filed on November 12, 1996 (available on microfiche and Westlaw, 1996 WL 656248).
27. Id. at 13-14.
28. CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 389, 392 (Paul
M. Angle ed., 1958) (emphasis removed), quoted in Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1765, 1779-80 (1994) (reviewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)).
29. Catholic Motion, supra note 26, at 15 (emphasis added).
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tionally protected interest in making those grave judgments for themselves, free from
the imposition of any religious or philosophical orthodoxy by court or legislature.30
The philosophers continue to argue throughout their brief that allowing
physician-assisted suicide is not a substantive moral or ethical position, but is
merely the embodiment of neutral rights of autonomy for individuals.  But, of
course, if the philosophers are correct, if the case really does not “require the
Court to make moral, ethical or religious judgments,” one must wonder why
the Court should care what six moral philosophers think about the issue.
The philosophers counterpose their “neutral” position to those prohibiting
assisted suicides, which they contend are only defensible on substantive, and
thereby prohibited, religious or ethical grounds.
Denying that opportunity to terminally-ill patients who are in agonizing pain or oth-
erwise doomed to an existence they regard as intolerable could only be justified on the
basis of a religious or ethical conviction about the value or meaning of life itself.  Our
Constitution forbids government to impose such convictions on its citizens.31
Although the philosophers are correct in asserting that assisted suicide can
only be prohibited on substantive grounds, assisted suicide also can only be
supported on equally contentious substantive grounds.  Thus, the philosophers
are not arguing for a “neutral position,” but are arguing for just as contentious
a substantive position as their opponents.  Further, the exclusion of substantive
conceptions of the good is itself an embodiment of the liberal values of individ-
ual autonomy and tolerance.  Thus, both the philosophers’ claim to a neutral,
nonsubstantive position and their exclusion of substantive conceptions of the
good are undercut.  This observation does not answer the question of whether
the Court’s decisions are persuasive regarding physician-assisted suicide, but it
removes the neutral liberal gloss from the philosophers’ position.  And since
much of the power of the philosophers’ arguments is found in their claim of
self-effacing neutrality, it takes much of the rhetorical sting out of their suppos-
edly neutral position.
A. Argument I: Due Process and Casey
The philosophers’ first argument is that prohibitions on assisted suicide
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that a citizen not be deprived
“of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”32  The philosophers
turn to the language of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,33 which upheld the deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade,34 offering the Court’s substantive due process argument
that “matters [] involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are cen-
tral to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”35  The philoso-
                                                          
30. Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 3, at 3.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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phers then present their main thesis regarding such substantive due process de-
cisions:  “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, re-
ligion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.”36  From this premise the philosophers assert that the deci-
sion to prolong life or commit suicide is a mere choice between two unresolv-
able, competing preferences of equal value:  “None of these dramatically dif-
ferent attitudes about the meaning of death can be dismissed as irrational.
None should be imposed, either by the pressure of doctors or relatives or by the
fiat of government, on people who reject it.”37  As the philosophers see it, some
prefer Pepsi; others Coke.  The right to die, like the subject of religion under
the common Establishment Clause argument, is so important that government
legislation should not regard it at all.  The philosophers support this contention
with the truism, “[d]eath is, for each of us, among the most significant events of
life.”38
An analysis of this first argument highlights many of the liberal themes
traced in Part II.  First, the philosophers assert the value of autonomy, immedi-
ately followed by an argument against imposing particular religious convictions
on others.  But, as noted above, valuing the individual pursuit of the good—
autonomy—above all other conceptions of the good is just such a particular
philosophical position.  Furthermore, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,39 from which the philosophers argue that sectarian positions are to be
excluded from political discourse, involved a mandatory recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance.  Thus, the philosophers attempt to equate the coercive
mandatory recital of allegiance to one’s country with support for legislation
based on a particular belief system.  It appears that the philosophers would bar
all legislation that is supported by a particular sectarian belief system.  But one
must ask, how else could one argue for any particular legislative position other
than out of one’s belief system?  And if, as argued above, all positions, even
liberal positions, represent particular beliefs, on what grounds could one legis-
late?  It seems a flip of the coin is the only permissible neutral means left for
arguing for legislation under the philosophers’ premises.  Lincoln’s argument
reverberates here: “Is it not a false statesmanship that undertakes to build up a
system of policy upon the basis of caring nothing about the very thing that
every body does care the most about?”40
The final liberal move the philosophers make to get their argument going is
to suggest that “none of these dramatically different attitudes about death can
be dismissed as irrational.”41  Thus, they assert the claim of fallibilism that un-
                                                          
36. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), quoted in Philosophers’
Brief, supra note 3, at 6.
37. Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 3, at 7.
38. Id.
39. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
40. CREATED EQUAL, supra note 28, at 389 (emphasis removed).
41. Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 3, at 7.
CHURCH.FMT.DOC 05/18/99  3:39 PM
Page 233: Autumn 1998] THE PHILOSOPHERS’ BRIEF 243
dergirds liberalism.  Since knowledge of the good is impossible, all rational po-
sitions should be tolerated.  This presupposition buried in the philosophers’ ar-
gument undercuts the ability of any participant in the debate to argue that one
position is simply wrong.  As Locke suggested, “[f]or every church is orthodox
to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical.”42  Therefore, one cannot argue that
one’s position on assisted suicide is a choice about whether or not to disobey
the law of God or to live the good life.  Once the philosophers have reduced the
argument to Pepsi versus Coke—personal preference—it is impossible to argue
against assisted suicide.  But, again, we return to Lincoln:  “He [Douglas] con-
tends that whatever community wants slaves has a right to have them.  So they
have if it is not a wrong.  But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right
to do wrong.”43
B. Argument II: Casey and Cruzan
The philosophers then look to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Casey and
Cruzan v. Missouri44 to continue their substantive due process analysis.  Re-
garding Casey, the Court’s famous “mystery phrase” is the center of the phi-
losophers’ argument:  “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.”45  The philosophers argue that the applicable principle derived from Casey
is that “[j]ust as a blanket prohibition on abortion would involve the improper
imposition of one conception of the meaning and value of human existence on
all individuals, so too would a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide.  The lib-
erty interest asserted here cannot be rejected without undermining the ration-
ale of Casey.”46  The philosophers again connect this argument with the truism
that “a decision to die involves one’s very ‘destiny.’”47
The philosophers are able to exploit Casey because of the difficult position
in which the government placed itself while arguing the assisted suicide cases.
Solicitor General Walter Dellinger’s amicus brief attempted to argue against
assisted suicide while still protecting Roe and Casey.  This was a difficult task
because both Casey and the philosophers’ brief rely on the liberal values of
autonomy and individual choice.  Thus, in accepting these liberal presupposi-
tions from the Casey decision while at the same time attempting to prevent
them from running to their logical conclusion in the assisted suicide cases, Del-
linger was working against his own first premises.  Correspondingly, to attack
the philosophers’ brief one must attack the decision of Casey as well.
Dellinger’s brief begins by accepting the Casey language of individuality
and abstract rationality.  “This Court has recently stated [in Casey] that the task
                                                          
42. LOCKE, supra note 5, at 25.
43. CREATED EQUAL, supra note 28, at 392.
44. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
45. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
46. Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 3, at 9.
47. Id.
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of defining the sphere of autonomy and personal dignity encompassed within
the meaning of ‘liberty’ ultimately requires a reliance on ‘reasoned judg-
ment.’”48  He goes on to deny, as the philosophers attempt to do, a general lib-
erty interest in the timing of one’s death, but attempts to acknowledge a limited
liberty interest in “obtaining relief from the kind of suffering experienced by
the plaintiffs in this case.”49  Dellinger then tries to distinguish abortion from
the liberty interest involved in assisted suicide.  “The fundamental right to
choose an abortion rests on a combination of constitutionally protected inter-
ests, of which avoiding the pain and suffering associated with being forced to
continue an unwanted pregnancy is but one part.  A prohibition on abortion in-
terferes with personal autonomy in an extremely consequential way.”50  But,
how can the right to die or not to die also not be “an extremely consequential”
decision?  Nonetheless, Dellinger argues that the state has a compelling interest
in making sure only those who are terminally ill are allowed to die, and that no
sure test can be fashioned to determine when this would occur.  But, of course,
the Court created just such an arbitrary line regarding when an abortion could
and could not be regulated by the State.  Thus Dellinger, after accepting all of
the liberal principles that undergird the philosophers’ position, cannot sustain a
meaningful argument against assisted suicide without relying on some substan-
tive conception of why assisted suicide is simply wrong.
Returning to the philosophers’ brief, their next argument focuses on the
Court’s decision in Cruzan, which created a right to refuse life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment.  The philosophers reject the position that refraining from aid is
different from actively inducing death.
When a competent patient does want to die, the moral situation is obviously different,
because then it makes no sense to appeal to the patient’s right not to be killed as a
reason why an act designed to cause his death is impermissible.  From the patient’s
point of view, there is no morally pertinent difference between a doctor’s terminating
treatment that keeps him alive, if that is what he wishes, and a doctor’s helping him to
end his own life by providing lethal pills he may take himself, when ready, if that is
what he wishes—except that the latter may be quicker and more humane.
51
The philosophers then argue that no meaningful difference between sus-
pending treatment and assisting suicide exists as well for the doctors “who be-
lieve that their most fundamental professional duty is to act in the patient’s in-
terests.”52
These arguments layer question begging upon question begging.  The dis-
pute here is “obviously” (to use the philosophers’ term) over what the
“pertinent moral principles” are.  Thus, the moral situation is not “obviously
different” from actively killing an unwilling patient since one of the very de-
bates embodied in the argument is whether a psychologically fragile patient can
                                                          
48. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) [hereinafter United States’s Brief].
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 3, at 11.
52. Id. at 12.
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ever be willing or unwilling.  As Dellinger’s brief noted, doctors play a critical
role in creating a patient’s expectations about what is in their best interest.
“[P]hysicians may offer lethal medications based on their own judgments con-
cerning the quality of the person’s life and their own belief that any rational
person in that condition would want assistance in committing suicide.”53  Simi-
larly, regarding a doctor’s moral situation, the very question in debate is over
what is “in the patient’s interests.”  The philosophers have not presented argu-
ments here, but merely assertions clothed in moral rhetoric.
The philosophers’ position is also ironic in the weight it lays on legal prece-
dent.  Although precedent is certainly the mode of legal argument, again one
wonders why moral philosophers take the time to write an amicus brief if the
heart of their argument merely contains the legal arguments for a right to as-
sisted suicide.  It seems these “diverse” moral philosophers are merely trying to
add their moral weight to these legal arguments, yet (in a liberal fashion) still
not delve into the substantive arguments for why these legal arguments are
morally compelling.  But, once again, why would one care what moral philoso-
phers think if they have no substantive position?  The philosophers do have a
covert position for which they are arguing; if they did not, their brief would
contribute nothing to the debate.
More substantively, the philosophers’ continued individualistic focus on the
patient’s rights as the only relevant moral category remains a controverted
framing of the issue.  One of the key points of an Aristotelian or communitar-
ian perspective is that societies, not individuals, are just; therefore, communi-
ties, not individuals, seek the good life.  As Sandel argues:
According to Aristotle, political community is more than “an association for residence
on a common site, or for the sake of preventing mutual injustice and easing ex-
change.” . . .  “The end and purpose of a polis is the good life, and the institutions of
social life are means to that end.”  It is only as participants in political association that
we can realize our nature and fulfill our highest ends.54
Likewise, even Dellinger suggests that legislators “must also concern them-
selves with the effects that creating an exception to that prohibition would have
on others.”55  Thus, there is “obviously” a different moral situation from homi-
cide only if one accepts the liberal premise that the only significant moral con-
siderations are those of the two individuals (patient and doctor) involved.  But,
if one’s substantive position is that the actions of individuals shape the moral
community that remains, then there may be no great difference between homi-
cide and assisted suicide.  Although such communitarian language is not famil-
iar to recent American jurisprudence, its rich embodiment in Aristotelian po-
litical ethics should give one pause in ignoring it.
A communitarian conception of adjudication would benefit the Court in
this situation and in the situations the Court confronted in Casey and Cruzan.
                                                          
53. United States’s Brief, supra note 48, at 20.
54. SANDEL, supra note 24, at 7 (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 119-20 (Ernest Barker trans.,
Oxford 1946)).
55. United States’s Brief, supra note 48, at 18.
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The Court often seems to fail to understand that it is not abstract legal plaintiffs
and defendants that stand before it, but particular people embedded in specific
communities and social contexts.  As Judge John T. Noonan, the author of the
Ninth Circuit’s original rejection of an assisted suicide right, has noted, “[r]ules
of law are formed by human beings to shape the attitude and conduct of human
beings and applied by human beings to human beings.  The human beings are
persons.  The rules are communications uttered, comprehended, and responded
to by persons.”56  Furthermore, individual actions shape and modify the world
in which we live and which others will inherit.  To fail to see the historic and so-
cial context within which people come to the Court is to fail to see the full pic-
ture that confronts the moral community in resolving this and other cases.
C. Argument III: The State’s Interests
Having made much of Dellinger’s acceptance of a constitutional right to
die, the philosophers finally turn to three arguments to rebut the existence of a
compelling state interest in prohibiting what they describe as “the exercise of a
liberty interest of constitutional dimension”57 in assisted suicide.  First, similar
risks of mistaken killings apply to protected Cruzan-type situations.58  Second,
regulations could protect against mistaken killings.59  Finally, the risk of mis-
take should not be considered anyway because it is merely a concern about the
influence of family and friends.  The philosophers contend that individuals
should have a right to determine if the personal beliefs of family and friends
will influence them.60  Thus, the coercion reflected by state prohibition is to be
rejected, but the “personal ethics” of patients give them the “right to hear and,
if they wish, act on what others might wish to tell or suggest or even hint to
them.”61  The philosophers’ concern is preventing the “mistake” of “preventing
many thousands of competent people who think that it disfigures their lives to
continue living, in the only way left to them, from escaping that—to them—
terrible injury.”62
Once again, the philosophers equate two principles as if they were obvi-
ously moral equivalents, but the mistake of killing and the mistake of living on
are not substantively the same possible mistakes.  The mistake made by choos-
ing suicide is irreversible by the very nature of death; the mistake of not aiding
suicide is not.  Thus, one may decide later that the “terrible injury” of continu-
ing to live was worth it—and this is the very concern that grounds the argu-
ments against assisted suicide.
Ironically, the philosophers follow these arguments with an acknowledg-
                                                          
56. JOHN T. NOONAN JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON,
AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 4 (1976).
57. Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 3, at 17.
58. See id. at 13-14.
59. See id. at 14-17.
60. See id. at 18.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 18-19.
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ment that the state does have an interest in
deny[ing] an opportunity for assisted suicide when it acts in what it reasonably judges
to be the best interests of the potential suicide, and when its judgment on that issue
does not rest on contested judgments about “matters involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy.”63
The philosophers then cite the example of nonterminally ill patients as an
example of people who could “reasonably” be prevented from committing sui-
cide on noncontroverted religious or ethical convictions.64  One can only ponder
what those reasonable reasons that all would agree on might be because it
seems hard to assert that all decisions regarding when one dies are not “central
to dignity and autonomy.”  Just as Dellinger could not stop the momentum of
the liberal first principles, the philosophers’ attempt to stop the momentum of
their argument fails without relying on some of the substantive positions they
want to exclude.  Therefore, their argument must logically run to an assisted
suicide right for all Americans.
The philosophers conclude by returning to their main contention that “any
paternalistic justification for an absolute prohibition of assistance to such pa-
tients would of necessity appeal to a widely contested religious or ethical con-
viction many of them, including the patient-plaintiffs, reject.”65  But once again,
one must reiterate that the philosophers are exactly correct; no reason for ac-
cepting an assisted suicide right cannot also appeal to “widely contested relig-
ious or ethical convictions.”
IV
CONCLUSION
The philosophers’ position, though cloaked in the language of liberal neu-
trality and counterposed to supposedly constitutionally suspect sectarian argu-
ments against assisted suicide, is actually just such a contentious sectarian posi-
tion.  Furthermore, the very argument that substantive conceptions of the good
should be excluded is a substantive conception of the good for the community.
Highlighting this fact does not win the argument for the anti-assisted suicide
camp.  But, it should make clear that this is just a fight between two sectarian
positions.  The Supreme Court should not be deceived that excluding sectarian
but including “rational neutral” arguments is capable of deciding contentious
cases, such as the assisted suicide cases, for there are no “rational neutral” ar-
guments.  Instead, competing conceptions of the good exist which deserve seri-
ous attention and consideration.
                                                          
63. Id. at 19 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
64. See id.
65. Id.
